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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE ) 
L. AKERS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
) 
Respondents, ) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
D.L.WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
An Idaho corporation; ) 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE ) 
WHITE, husband and wife; ) 
) 
Appellants, ) 
) 
and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and ) 
MARTIE E. MORTENSEN, husband ) 
and Wife, Defendants, ) 
) 
Appellants. ) 
---------------------------) 
APPELLANTS WHITES' 
REPLY BRIEF 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 
39493-2011 
District Court Docket No. CV 02-222 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai 
Robert Covington 
8884 North Government Way 
Suite A 
Hayden, ID 83835 
Tel. 208-762-4545 
Fax: 208-762-4546 
Attorney for Appellants White 
Honorable John T. Mitchell 
District Judge, Presiding 
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Leander James & Susan Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Tel: 208-667-0683 
Fax: 208-664-1684 
Attorneys for Respondents 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Much of the pending appeal revolves around the question of whether the record, 
especially the testimony and documentary evidence at trial, supports the conclusions of the 
trial court that fall within the scope of the case as it now stands. It necessarily follows that 
command of the evidence by the appellate court is of the first priority in making a 
judgment with respect to this appeal. The trial transcript and documentary evidence is 
very substantial and difficult to command thoroughly. Counsel for Whites has presented 
all of the relevant testimony on the subject of easement location in his briefing that was 
submitted to the trial court on this subject. The briefing is found in the Clerk's Record at 
pages 173-205. Copies of pages of the transcript were included by counsel for Akers in her 
briefing in the Clerk's Record at pages 233-367. Only by command of the record can the 
Court identify and properly weigh various erroneous statements of the content of the 
record. Counsel for Whites submits that briefing submitted in this matter by Akers 
frequently erroneously mis-characterizes the testimony in the record in an attempt to 
discredit Whites' contentions. An example is found in the third paragraph of Respondents' 
Brief that was filed on November 2, 2012 on page 26 where counsel states that Peplinski 
testified, "As testified to by Peplinski, any changes he made to the access road as it crossed 
Parcel B were minimal, and consisted of widening out the corner. It did not consist of 
shortening or lengthening the road as it crossed Akers' Parcel B." Peplinski's testimony on 
this subject is found verbatim at page 184 of the Clerk's Record where Peplinski testifies 
"Vh, it had a tendency to curve into our property more, and we changed the corner so it 
would widen out so we could turn into our Quonset hut more easily .... Vh, minimal. 
Nothing actually changed (on Akers' property, parenthesis added) because we curved onto 
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our property." Careful reading of the transcript testimony and command of the 
documentary evidence will reveal that Peplinski meant that he did not change the road on 
Aker's property because he curved it south onto his property when he adjusted it position 
in 1983-84. Akers omitted mentioning that Peplinski testified that he curved the road more 
onto his property. Thus, the claim of Akers that counsel for Whites made an incorrect 
contention is flatly untrue, based upon the record. The point is that command of the 
factual details as presented in the record in this case is critically important and counsel for 
Whites urges the Court not to rely on characterizations by Akers of the evidence that are 
inaccurate or incomplete. Please consult the record directly and thoroughly. 
ARGUMENT 
Whites' argument in this brief will focus on areas of substantial dispute with Akers' 
contentions in their brief, especially erroneous descriptions of the record. Whites fully rely 
upon and remain committed to the arguments made in their opening brief in this appeal 
and in other briefs submitted in this matter on previous appeals and to the trial court. 
Silence on any issue presented in Akers' brief is not an indication of acquiescence in Akers' 
statement of facts, legal theories or argument. 
1. Did the District Court err in its decision regarding the size and location of the 
prescriptive easement determined by the Court? 
The analysis by Akers in Respondents' Brief attempts to demonstrate that the trial 
court's choice of location of the easement at the top of the hill is supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. Bear in mind that the trial court erred when it stated that the 
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relevant time for this analysis was 1966. Akers does not address this error by the trial 
court. Nevertheless, Akers analysis does the opposite in revealing a dearth of competent 
and substantial evidence because it relies upon a fundamental statement that is plainly 
contrary to the evidence. That statement is found on page 27 of said brief in the first 
paragraph where it is stated, "Thus, at the time Scott Rasor performed his survey of the 
road, there had been little changes made to it since 1966." As should be apparent, this 
statement is contradicted by Akers and Peplinski who agreed that the road was changed in 
location by Peplinski in approximately 1983 so that according to Peplinski, it curved more 
onto his property, and according to Akers, the road was extended to the west on Akers 
land. Though Akers claim is plainly untrue based upon the aerial photographs, both 
admitted and offered, and Peplinski's testimony is not contradicted, Akers then claims that 
the road location as depicted in Exhibits D57 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit 176 was the same as in 
1966. D57 showed the road in approximately 1993 and 176 in 2002. This claim is 
stupendously false and could hardly have been made in good faith. Ironically, Akers points 
out the property corner stake near the "big tree" in D57 and Plaintiffs' 176 that marked 
the turning point according the Mr. Millsap, in other words, the westerly end of the road 
prior to 1983. Akers then further uses these exhibits to claim that they depict the turn of 
the road to the south during the relevant time for the prescriptive easement. A comparison 
of the 1998 aerial photograph to D44 will demonstrate that the road in 1998 was materially 
different in location than prior to 1980. This claim makes me wonder who wrote Akers' 
brief since they plainly did not present this evidence in a manner that is consistent with the 
record in this case. 
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The reasoning presented on this issue in Whites' initial brief is not diminished by 
the argument presented by Akers brief. Rasor's location of the roadway in 2002 was not 
the location between 1966 and 1980. There is no substantial or competent evidence to 
establish that the roadway turned south ten feet from the 19/24 corner as found by the trial 
court. 
2. Did the District Court err in refusing to consider and admit additional proffered 
evidence relevant to the location of the easement in the area specified on remand for 
the purpose of accurately and precisely locating the easement? 
Akers seriously misconstrues the meaning of the suggestion of Whites' counsel in his 
brief on Easement Location dated October 22, 2009 when Akers claims that the area 
referenced by Whites counsel on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 was the area chosen by the trial court. 
Whites counsel referred to the "graveled surface" depicted in Exhibit 6. The "gravel 
surface" to which Whites' counsel referred is shown on Exhibit 6 as the area between the 
fence constructed by Akers on the north and the north boundary of the "10' -12' wide 
travel surface". This is the area occupied by the roadway after 1983 and is confirmed by 
the marked fence that Akers had constructed along the north side of the access road as it 
crossed Akers' property in Section 24. Akers' argument that Whites' counsel agreed that 
the route of the travel surface shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 is untrue and contrary to 
Whites' contention throughout this case. Had the Court chosen to commission a metes and 
bounds description of the area intended by Whites' counsel, the easement location would 
have been much closer to one supported by the evidence. 
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As presented in their initial brief, Whites rely upon the authority of Sinnet v. Werelus, 83 
Idaho 514 (1961) and succeeding cases as the basis on which the trial court should have 
taken additional evidence to properly locate the easement at the top of the hill. This 
authority does not require oversight, ignorance or inability to justify taking evidence to 
properly locate an easement such as in issue in this case, though counsel explained to the 
court in Whites Motion to Consider Additional Evidence that the online data base on which 
the offered photographs were found did not have a viewer in 2002 that showed the details 
of the photographs that were available when they were found by Welch Comer Engineers 
in 2009. R. Vol. II, p. 360-361. In all respects Whites submit that their initial brief on this 
appeal, pages 23-27 thereof, demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to consider additional evidence to locate the easement. 
3. Did the District Court err in its award of damages, treble damages, punitive 
damages, damages for emotional distress and attorney fees? 
Central to the questions on damages and attorney fees is the question of whether I.C. 6-
202 applies in this case. If it does not, then Akers damages should be determined under 
common law trespass theories. As argued previously, Whites do not believe that I.e. 6-202 
applies in this case as Whites conduct was not willful or intentional within the meaning of 
that statute and the requisite posting did not include the areas of the access road in which 
all relevant activity occurred. 
Akers' brief erroneously states as fact that the "boggy area" that into which White 
placed fill material after he was instructed not to use the curved approach was west of the 
junction ofthe curved approach with the access road along the south boundary. In fact, as 
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the relevant photographs show, the filled area was east of that junction immediately south 
of the disputed triangle, an area that had not been used for access since Akers constructed 
the curved approach in approximately 1982. This is significant because that area is within 
the express easement, steep and required fill to permit passage by grass seed trucks and 
other equipment after use of the curved approach was precluded. The fill did not impair 
Akers' access over the curved approach or on the access road in the express easement. The 
damages Akers claimed at trial as related to the fill material was to return the disputed 
triangle to its condition prior to Whites' purchase of the property in December, 2001. 
In understanding this case it is important to have command of the timeline of events 
and Whites' conduct. Briefly, Whites purchased the property on December 20,2001, in a 
transaction in which their right of access to their property over the access road was insured 
by Stewart Title Company through its agent, North Idaho Title Company. On January 2, 
2002 Whites began work on their property by commencing excavation at the top of the hill 
to adjust the road design on their property, not on Akers' property. Whites used the 
curved approach to travel up the hill for this work. This work was red tagged due to lack 
of permit and a permit was issued on January 3, 2002. Akers sued Whites on January 10, 
2002. The complaint focused on excavation by Whites at the top of the hill where the work 
was red tagged. After Akers complaint was filed and use of the approach by White was 
discontinued, White had the property surveyed to determine its boundaries in the area of 
the access road and the approach to the access road from the county road. The boundaries 
indicated by the survey did not include the approach area. White undertook to use the old 
entry to the access road through what became known as the disputed triangle area. During 
the spring of 2002 White place fill material in this area to allow his equipment, specifically 
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a grass seed truck to go up the road to distribute grass seed over the recently excavated 
ground on Whites' property. By June, 2002, this work was completed, the litigation was in 
full swing and Whites work on the site had ended. During the work on the site in the 
winter and spring of 2002, several confrontations happened involving White, Dennis Akers 
and Sherry Akers, Mortensen and an employee of D.L. White Construction, Inc. White 
himself was involved only in the confrontation with Sherry Akers and the Kootenai County 
Sheriff at the beginning of the dispute. None of these confrontations involved any physical 
contact between the parties. White did not control or authorize any of the conduct by 
Mortensen or the employee of D.L. White Construction, Inc. insofar as it involved Sherry 
Akers. 
In this context, Whites submit that I.e. 6-202 does not apply and punitive damages 
are not warranted nor are the findings of the trial court applying I.C. 6-202 and punitive 
damages supported by substantial and competent evidence. Any damages to which Akers 
may be entitled for use ofthe disputed triangle area should be governed by the common 
law of trespass. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of January, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of January, 2013, I caused to be senred a true 
and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by placing the same in the United States 
Mail, First Class, postage prepaid thereon, to the following: 
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Susan Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: 208-664-1684 
Vernon J. Mortensen 
PO Box 1922 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 
Dustin Deissner 
Deissner Law Office 
1707 West Broadway Avenue 
Spokane,WA 99201 
Fax: 509-326-6978 
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